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Beyond the Squabble: Putting the Tenderloin
Community Justice Center in Context
MICHAEL COBDEN*
WITH JUDGE RON ALBERS

Introduction
The Tenderloin Community Justice Center ("CJC") is not new,
experimental or revolutionary. Rather, it is one of many courts
around the country that make use of a variety of tools besides
incarceration to try and solve the underlying causes of a person's
criminal acts. The CJC is modeled directly on very successful courts
already in existence throughout the country and the world. The CJC,
which opened its doors in March of 2009, is still fighting for survival
in the midst of a violent political climate and a fiscal drought, but it
deserves our honest and thoughtful consideration. Unfortunately, the
depth of misconception surrounding the whole project threatens to
make the necessary debate over theory and fact little more than a
political skirmish of hyperbole and puffery. Ultimately, I will argue
that the CJC warrants our best efforts so that we may realize
potential fiscal savings for the government, as well as the true
rehabilitation and systemic change that the community justice model
offers.
This paper aims to frame the debate more clearly, explaining the
theory and models that the CJC is built upon. I will summarize the
growth of similar projects around the country and in California, and
relate it to some of the data that has been collected about these
projects. I will further explain the shortcomings of the traditional
* I would like to thank Judge Albers for his generosity of time, insight and experience,
Aaron Rappaport for providing me the opportunity to work on this project, Kate Bloch for
introducing me to criminal law, Al Dover for his continued support and mentoring, my parents,
Julie and Richard Cobden for, well, everything, and most importantly the editorial staff of the
Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journalfor their hard work and tireless efforts to make every

article as good as it can be.
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criminal justice system, which the CJC aims to address, and the
reasons why proponents of the CJC regard it as the best solution to
some of San Francisco's problems. Finally, I will address two key
criticisms of the CJC that recur throughout the current debate. I
should note that this paper is not attempting to give a complete or
even fully accurate account of the history and implementation of the
community court concept. Rather, it aims to provide a brief synopsis
of what these courts entail and how they fundamentally differ from
what most people would consider a "normal" criminal court.

I. Theory and Practice of Problem-Solving Courts
A few years ago, I was introduced to the concepts of restorative
justice and alternative models of adjudication through readings
assigned in a seminar on the theories of punishment. Restorative
Justice, discussed more fully below, is based on the theory that crime
divides the community, and the government has a unique opportunity
to repair that division. The particular example presented in the
reading concerned a Native American "sentencing circle" that
involved an offender and a victim speaking with one another among
family, elders and leaders in order to facilitate reconciliation. I A few
weeks later, a student who had presented research he conducted on
community justice (a concept slightly different from restorative
justice, but closely related) was greeted by suspicion because his
examples, the class thought, closely resembled the "hugging circle"
featured in the prior reading. This was an unfortunate response, and
highlighted for me the degree of misunderstanding that surrounds the
concept of community justice. Innovative theories of courts and
justice centered on the community and alternatives to incarceration
are not attempting to coddle criminals. Such courts represent the
recognition that crime has causes, communities are victims, and
prisons are not the only tools that should be available to the justice
system.2

1. Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359, 377

(2005).
2. See generally Gregory Toomey, Community Courts 101: A Quick Survey Course, 42
IDAHO L. REV. 383.
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Two theories are frequently cited 3 as the bases for the last decade
of court innovation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Restorative
Justice. Therapeutic Jurisprudence rests on the notion that the court
has an impact on the life, health and well being of the parties
involved in a given case. 4 This is not a difficult concept to embrace;
most of us can agree that even in a civil case, the consequences of a
legal outcome reach far into the lives of people who are not even
parties to the case. Not surprisingly, the collateral consequences of
sending a person to jail are tremendous. Recognizing the potential
impact of the court's rulings is only part of the theory, however.
Most criticisms of the theory focus on the court's use of its power to
affect certain outcomes and attempt to assess the effectiveness of
those practices. 5 Critics' main concern appears to be the court's
paternalistic approach to justice, coercing defendants into decisions
that may or may not be good for them or for society.6 Alternatively,
proponents point out that the benefits of using the courts to promote
positive changes in the lives of offenders and their communities far
outweigh any perceived paternalism, and that the therapeutic
approach is no more coercive than more traditional models of
adjudication.
Therapeutic Jurisprudence provides the theoretical basis for a
subset of "problem-solving" courts known as drug courts. 7 Because
merely applying the correct law to the facts of the case will never
end the cycle of addiction and crime that parade through courtrooms
every day, drug courts attempt to find new tools to address the
specific problems that drug abuse presents. 8 Studies have shown that
increased judicial supervision over offenders with drug addiction
problems can significantly help in overcoming the cycle of addiction,
while failure to maintain effective supervision can result in more
frequent relapse. 9 There is little question that, in spite of the
3. Id. at 387.
4. Peggy F. Hora, William G. Schma & John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's
Response to DrugAbuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 444-45 (1999).
5. Toomey, supra note 2, at 388-89.
6. Id. at 388.
7. Hora et al., supra note 4, at 448-49.
8. See generally Douglas B. Marlowe, Effective Strategies for Intervening with Drug
Abusing Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 989 (2002).
9. AMANDA B. CISSNER & MICHAEL REMPEL, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE STATE

OF DRUG COURT RESEARCH: MOVING BEYOND 'Do THEY WORK?' 1 (2005), available at
http://www.courtinnovation.org/uploads/documents/state*20ofo/20dc
20research.pdf; Eric L.
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"touchy-feely" criticisms often leveled at drug courts and the theory
of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, this model for judicial solutions to
drug addiction has been successful.
Another example of the Therapeutic Jurisprudence theory in
practice is in mental health courts. These courts divert mentally ill
offenders to a separate court docket in order to better address the
mental illnesses that may be causing criminal activity.' 0 Rather than
a coddling approach, these courts simply recognize that they cannot
treat all offenders equally and expect positive results."' Results from
mental health courts around the country show that eighty to ninety
percent of offenders who participated in the program were not
arrested for over a year after completion. 12
Restorative Justice is another concept that recognizes that a
criminal act has many consequences which are not addressed by the
traditional model of criminal justice. 13 This approach seeks to mend
harms caused by crime by attempting to restore all concerned parties
(victim, offender, and community) to relative stability.14 Under this
view, the community has a stake in every criminal case that extends
beyond conviction. For example, the youth who vandalizes a shopfront damages the property of the owner and also the community as a
whole. As a consequence, that youth owes a debt to the victim as
well as the neighborhood, which cannot be repaid through time in a
cell. A court attempting to restore the parties to a beneficial position
would need options besides fines, probation or jail time.
Community courts emerged as one way of practicing the theories
of justice described above. In the United States, the community
court movement began in New York City with the Midtown
Community Court in 1993.15 Community courts addressed low-level
Jensen & Clayton Mosher, Adult Drug Courts: Emergence, Growth, Outcome Evaluations, and
the Need for a Continuum of Care, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 443 (2006); Douglas B. Marlowe et al.,
Adapting Judicial Supervision to the Risk Level of Drug Offenders: Discharge and 6-month
Outcomes from a ProspectiveMatching Study, 88 DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE (Suppl. 2):
S4-13 (2007).
10. Gregory L. Acquaviva, Mental Health Courts: No Longer Experimental, 36 SETON
HALL L. REV. 971, 985-86 (2006).
11. Id. at 974.
12. Id. at 991-93; John R. Neiswender, Executive Summary of Evaluation of Outcomes for
King County Mental Health Court 2, 4, 7 (2004).
13. Toomey, supra note 2, at 391.
14. TODD R. CLEAR & DAVID R. KARP, THE COMMUNITY JUSTICE IDEAL: PREVENTING
CRIME AND ACHIEVING JUSTICE 102-03, 157 (John Hagan ed., Westview Press 1999).
15. Toomey, supra note 2, at 392.

Winter 20101

BEYOND THE SQUABBLE

criminal activity by utilizing a combination of punishment and social
services. 16 One of the unique features of community courts is the
speed with which they respond to individual defendants. 17 A person
arrested early in the morning could be before a judge by noon. Once
the court decides an appropriate sentence, the offender could very
well be performing community service that same day. This close
temporal connection between adjudication and punishment helps to
emphasize the relationship between the crime and the community
that was harmed by it. If the court determines that the crime relates
to other problems in the offender's life, it can offer immediate access
to social services housed in the same building.' 8 Over the years, the
court has developed partnerships with neighborhood groups to
provide job training, mental health access and homeless outreach.
The project focused on information, coordination and efficiency to
solve the underlying problems masked by a deceptively simple
criminal charge.
The Midtown Community Court model was extremely effective.
The compliance rates for community service was up to seventy-five
percent, the highest in the city. 19 Arrests for prostitution dropped
fifty-six percent and illegal vending dropped twenty-four percent
within eighteen months. 20 Both were crimes specifically identified
by the community as serious problems before the court was
created. 2 1 The Midtown court served as a model for community
courts in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Harlem. Each community court
was specially tailored to the needs and strengths of the neighborhood
it served. Eventually, the court served as the template for projects in
over three-dozen cities across the country. In 2008, a delegation
from San Francisco visited the Midtown Community Court in order

16. Dana Kralstein, Community Court Research: A Literature Review 1 (2005), Center for
Court
Innovation,
available at
http://www.courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/
ccresearch.pdf.
17. Center for Court Innovation, Midtown Community Court, http://courtinnovation.org/
index.cfn?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage&PageID=591&currentTopTier2-lrue (last visited Oct. 23,
2009).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Greg Berman & Anne Gulick, Just the Unwieldy, Hard to Gather, But Nonetheless
Essential Facts, Ma 'am: What We Know and Don't Know About Problem-Solving Courts, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1027, 1038-39 (2003).
21. Id.
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to examine how the model could be applied to the Tenderloin
district.22
Many people respond to the Tenderloin CJC by asking, "Don't
we already have community courts in San Francisco?"
This
misconception arises from nomenclature. In San Francisco, there is a
system of alternative adjudication programs, sometimes referred to
as "diversion" programs that are called "community courts. 23
These courts are vastly different in purpose and function from the
community courts based on the model discussed above and therefore
do not compete with the Tenderloin CJC. Furthermore, any data from
these previous "community courts" should not be attributed to the
CJC model.
The San Francisco District Attorney's office describes the current
community courts in terms that make them seemingly similar to the
24
community courts in New York and the Tenderloin CJC.
However, the differences are fundamental and structural. First, the
current community courts in San Francisco are not really courts at
all. They are technically not part of the court system. Instead, they
are actually proceedings overseen by a "judge arbitrator" 25 in
consultation with a panel of community members, rather than by a
traditional judge.26
Additionally, the sanctions available at
community courts are limited to fines and community service. 27
Although the courts provide some access to resources, such as
counseling, the service providers are not as intimately coordinated
28
with the court as providers at the Midtown Community Court.
Drug treatment services are not directly available to participants,
who must instead go through a complicated diversion program with
22. Heather Knight, S.F. 's New Community Court Opens, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 5, 2009, at Al.
23. Maya Nordberg, Jails Not Homes: Quality of Life on the Streets of San Francisco, 13
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 261, 296 (2002).
24. San Francisco District Attorney's Office - Neighborhood Safety, Community Court
Program, http://www.sfdistrictattorney.org/page.asp?id=44 [hereinafter Neighborhood Safety]
(last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
25. A judge arbitrator is a person chosen to facilitate the resolution of a dispute. They are
not judges, but rather community members who apply for the position with the Community Court
Advisory Committee and attend training.
26. GABRIEL CABRERA & ELAINE FORBES, CITY & COUNTY OF S.F. BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS, THE COMMUNITY COURTS MODEL AND FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTATION IN
SAN FRANCISCO (2001).
27. Id.
28. Id.
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specific criteria for participation. 29 Offenders are not monitored for
adherence to the program and the court has no increased sanctions
for failing to comply. Offenders who do not successfully complete
sanctions are simply sent back to the
community service or other
30
traditional court system.
Such restrictions placed on San Francisco community courts
imply that the courts are limited to quality-of-life infractions. This
limitation makes them unable to impose jail time as a consequence of
an offender's failure to adhere to orders or guarantee access to all
available resources in the social service system. Key aspects of the
Midtown model and the Tenderloin CJC address all these
shortcomings. The CJC is a real court, presided over by a judge who
can monitor the offender over time and impose a wide variety of
sanctions for both minor and major slips in performance. 3 1 It also
offers a wider variety of treatment programs and social services than
the San Francisco community courts, and the proximity of such
resources means that communication and delivery of services can be
nearly instantaneous. 32
I do not mean to imply that the current San Francisco community
court programs are ineffective. To the contrary, they have been
shown to save a great deal of money for the city and achieve some
positive outcomes for participants. 3 3 However, they are not a
substitute for the type of court that the CJC is intended to be.

II. The Tenderloin Community Justice Center
The Tenderloin CJC is modeled after similar courts in New York,
especially the Midtown Community Court and the Red Hook
The CJC is multiCommunity Justice Center in Brooklyn.
jurisdictional, meaning that it handles different levels of crimes such
34
as citations, infractions, misdemeanors and some felony cases.
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id.at 4.
31. Tamara Barak Aparton, Seeking Justicefor Tenderloin Court, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 13.
2009, available at http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/Seeking-justice-for-Tenderloin-court53082352.html.
32. Id.
33. Neighborhood Safety, supra note 24.
34. Center for Court Innovation - Community Court, Interviews, Commissioner Ron
Albers, San Francisco Community Justice Center, http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cfm?
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This approach gives the court more latitude to reach those who may
need help or intervention the most. Additionally, the court has more
leverage to encourage an offender to take advantage of services and
programs made available at the court. A drug offender may be less
reluctant to realize the long-term benefits of an eighteen-month
treatment program if the potential punishment is only six months in
jail. More serious crimes are punishable by lengthier terms of
imprisonment. The CJC can therefore leverage this power to offer
offenders a choice between going to jail or completing treatment,
encouraging the latter.
The current court system has almost no input from the
communities it serves. On the other hand, the CJC has been the
product of the community from the beginning of the planning
process. The steering committee is made up of government officers
and community members. 35 Planners engaged in a lengthy survey of
the neighborhoods that will be served by the CJC, including an
extensive effort to survey homeless persons and indigent residents of
the Tenderloin and South of Market areas. 36 The survey provided
planners with insight into what residents want from the court, what
they like about the current state of law enforcement and what they
feel are failures of the status quo. 37 As the CJC continues to operate,
input from the community will be regularly incorporated into the
growth and development of the project, ensuring that the court is
truly a product of the community.
One of the more significant results of the survey taken during the
planning stages of the CJC indicated residents generally felt that
social services in the Tenderloin were not coordinated.38 The two
model courts, Red Hook Community Justice Center and the Midtown
Community Court, have each experienced great success in the
coordination of service providers in their areas. This approach is
fuseaction=Document.viewDocument&documentlD=961 &documentTopiclD= 17&documentTyp
elD=8 (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
35. Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice - Community Involvement, Community Justice
Center, http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/site/mocj-page.asp?id=85690&mode-text (last visited Oct. 23,
2009).
36. Id.
37. OFFICE OF COLLABORATIVE JUSTICE PROGRAMS, SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., COUNTY
OF S.F., COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER BASELINE SURVEY, FALL 2008 (2008), available at
http://www.sfsuperiorcourt.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx? documentid= 1967.
38. Id.
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particularly effective because the person who is brought into the
court for a drug charge may need far more than just drug counseling;
he may need job training, assistance with housing issues and health
care. The potential exists for a centralized system, allowing the court
to examine the totality of an offender's problems to create a solution
based on a global view of the available resources and services. This
is precisely what the CJC is trying to accomplish, and based on the
success of similar courts, what the CJC will be able to do.
III. Criticisms of the Community Justice Center
The CJC has been the subject of a great deal of public debate and
political maneuvering since San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom
first adopted the project. Besides the inevitable political polarization
that tends to accompany any major proposal in San Francisco, there
are two areas that seem to be the main focus for critics of this
project. 39 First, critics argue that the current economy renders the
CJC unaffordable, and would require cutting the very services the
CJC would help provide.4 ° The second point made by the critics is
that delivery of social services to the poor through a criminal court is
a disturbing and dangerous model because it ties assistance to
criminal conduct and police intervention. 4 '
A. Fiscal Concerns
Many concerns surrounding the recent political debate over the
CJC have centered on the issue of funding. The main argument
addresses the reluctance to embark on a new, expensive and risky
project when the current budget crisis has reduced the amount of
funds available for existing projects.42 The argument is most
39. The criticisms I discuss below are distillations of arguments made at the panel
discussion on Community Courts at the California Correctional Crisis Conference hosted by U.C.
Hastings, as well as printed materials brought to that panel by the Coalition on Homelessness and
newspaper articles discussing the project for the past several years.
40. This concern was expressed through the presentation of the Coalition on Homelessness
in the Community Courts Panel at the California Correctional Crisis Conference and in personal
conversations with homeless advocates by the author.
41. See generallyNordberg, supra note 23.
42. Joshua Sabatini, Tenderloin Court FundingLocked Up, S.F. EXAMINER, May 15, 2008,
available at http://www.examiner.com/a-1392369-Tenderloincourt_funding-lockedup.html?
cid=ss-SanFrancisco.
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compelling when proponents assert that the very programs the CJC
rely upon to address the problems in the Tenderloin will need to be
cut in order to fund the CJC itself.43 Such a stance makes the CJC
appear to be a self-defeating, dangerous and wasteful endeavor. The
complexities and nuances of governmental budgets are beyond the
scope of this paper, and I cannot predict the actual decisions of the
board of supervisors and the mayor's office regarding the programs
that will continue to receive funding under future budgets. However,
I will provide some examples illustrating how the CJC will affect the
budget.
In fiscal year 2008-2009, the City and County of San Francisco
had a total budget expenditure of $6,531,467,931." 4 According to
the most recent report from the San Francisco Controller's office, the
city faces a projected budgetary shortfall in 2009 of approximately
$438 million. 45 This shortfall represents approximately seven
percent of the total budget. Although it is unclear where the city will
choose to trim the money, there are many potential areas where a
small reduction could conceivably be made so that the total shortfall
is distributed among the many programs the city supports. My point
is that the shortfall would not have to result in cutting programs for
the homeless in the Tenderloin. When confronted with a shortfall,
the answer is not necessarily to cut out the newest program on the
table, but to see where cuts will be most effective and where they
will be most destructive. I contend that cutting the CJC will be
extremely unwise because it is the sort of program that would make
each dollar spent on other programs more effective.
Human Services Agency projects throughout the city represent
approximately ten percent of the total budget, at $682,217,909.46
These projects include housing and homelessness programs,
47
children's services, food stamps and workforce development.
43. Id.
44. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, CONSOLIDATED BUDGET AND ANNUAL

APPROPRIATION ORDINANCE, FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 2009 12 (2009), available at
http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/controller/budget information/aao/FY_2008-09_FINAL
_AAO_OCR_ VI.pdf
45. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, THREE-YEAR BUDGET PROJECTION FOR
GENERAL FUND SUPPORTED OPERATIONS, FISCAL YEARS 2009-10 THROUGH 2011-12 1 (2009),
available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/controllerIbudget information/3year/ JointReport.pdf.
46. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, supra note 44.
47. Id.
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Many of these projects, as well as several groups that operate
independently of the government, will be called upon by the CJC to
be partners. Because the CJC ultimately relies heavily on these
programs, it would indeed be unfortunate if the city chose to cut
these programs in order to fund the CJC itself.
The CJC is expected to cost approximately $1.7 to $2.8 million
annually.4 8 However, the project will actually cost the city only half
of that projected amount after federal grants totaling $1,334,000 are
approved for the project. 49 The resulting cost of the CJC represents
less than half of one percent of the budgetary shortfall predicted for
the upcoming year, which literally translates to a drop in the bucket.
Many people may argue that seemingly insignificant expenditures
can add up to serious burden, and others may point to services that
could have been purchased for needy people with the money
allocated to the CJC. It is vital to take into account that the CJC has
the potential to make every dollar spent on community assistance
more effective by coordinating the efforts of disparate organizations
and streamlining delivery of services with a holistic view of the
individual offender's needs.
By taking lessons learned from the drug courts and the mental
health courts that have been operating successfully for many years, it
is shown that courts can be very effective mechanisms to ensure
maximum efficacy for substance abuse and mental health
programs.5 0 In many ways, it is the power of the court to compel
orders and monitor progress that makes the programs suitable for
people with serious addictions. 5' But the community justice center
model can take this idea further. By acting as a hub for existing
programs, the CJC can offer any citizen, offender or victim, a single
location to access a wide variety of services and support systems. As
discussed above, one of the most significant problems identified by
residents of the Tenderloin and South of Market areas in the needs
assessment survey was that access to services was chaotic,
disorganized and difficult.5 2 However, the CJC provides a central

48. Aparton, supra note 31.
49. Fact Sheet, San Francisco Community Justice Center January 2009, available at
http://www.sfsuperiorcourt.orglModules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=2156.
50. See supra note 9.
51. Marlowe et al., supra note 8, at 1019-21
52. See OFFICE OF COLLABORATIVE JUSTICE PROGRAMS, supra note 37.
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point around which hard work and tax dollars can rally to achieve
maximum effectiveness.
Aside from the hub model of coordinating services, the court has
a unique ability to provide central oversight from both the
perspective of the person needing help and from that of a
government officer. Because a judge can identify all the roadblocks
preventing an offender from reaching his goal of living
independently, including cessation of SSI benefits as a result of a
misdemeanor conviction, lack of access to medical care, or drug
dependence, courts are in a better position to understand how these
problems work together and simultaneously implement direct action.
No social worker can do this alone. It is possible to increase funding
five times over for homelessness and mental health services, but the
tangle of bureaucratic and legal obstacles will consistently prevent
full access to the services designed to help people in need who may
lack the understanding and patience necessary to navigate the social
services system. Mere funding of the status quo is not enough. The
CJC represents reorganization and a new way of addressing the
problems that plague society. Most importantly, the cost of this
program is miniscule compared to what it can do.
Finally, as the fiscal analysis of the drug courts has shown,
collaborative courts can save significant amounts of money over the
long run. If the cost savings of drug courts were applied to the CJC,
the result would be a new system with reduced court and
incarceration costs that will pay for itself within a few years, all for a
relatively minor investment. There needs to be an effective way of
maximizing the worth of every dollar in the face of severe budget
restraints. The community has an opportunity to save money
tomorrow by making a small investment today.
B. Criminalization of Poverty
The second significant criticism of the CJC is that it further
criminalizes the activities and status of poverty itself. This particular
critique is central to the opposition against the CJC recently voiced
by the Coalition on Homelessness ("Coalition"). According to
materials written by the Coalition and presented at the California
Correctional Crisis Conference in March 2009, they have several
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specific objections to the overall concept of a community court that
ties needed services to a guilty plea. There is added cause for
concern when the offense is an act that is necessary for survival on
the streets.53
The first misconception held by the Coalition is that one would
need to plead guilty to a crime in order to receive services. The
steering committee for the CJC has made clear since last year that
services in the CJC would be available to all residents of the city and
not merely to criminal defendants. 54 It is accurate that drug courts,
and many of the community courts across the country, require a
guilty plea before an offender can enter into treatment programs, but
such a requirement has more to do with the legal rights of a criminal
defendant than the desire to obtain increased convictions. In some
cases, the CJC would have the power to dismiss charges after
successful completion of programs, resulting in a clean record as
well as access to services.55
Another concern of the Coalition is that the CJC will increase the
criminalization of poverty. People who are homeless engage in the
same acts as non-homeless people, yet many of these acts become
illegal when performed in public places. Examples of such behavior
might include urination, bathing, eating and sleeping. 56 The history
of legislation targeting the poor by addressing quality-of-life crimes
explains the degree of suspicion directed towards any criminal
justice project that seeks to address problems peculiar to homeless
populations. 57 These laws are often enacted specifically to remove
homeless people from the streets and thereby
keep public areas clean
58
society.
of
rest
the
for
and uncluttered
There is no doubt that these laws transform homelessness into a
series of criminal acts. Nevertheless, would critics of such laws
prefer that the homeless be left alone to continue living in a cycle of
poverty without public regard? I believe we would all prefer to see
homeless persons provided with help, support and direction to attain
a minimum standard of living. Rising up to this standard would also
53. See generally Nordberg, supra note 23.
54. San Francisco Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice, Community Justice Center Plan April 2008, http://www.sfgov.org/site/mocj-page.asp?id=86588 (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
55. Aparton, supra note 31.
56. Nordberg, supra note 23, at 269.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 263-69.
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likely insulate them from laws that tend to target the poor
disproportionately.
Any complaint with the existence of quality-of-life statutes
cannot be a complaint about the institutions that adjudicate them. A
criticism of quality-of-life laws is a criticism of the city government
Courts do not generally make policy, but rather are
itself
instruments of policy. The Legislature decides to enact laws and sets
the agenda for the government, the Executive generally chooses how
to enforce that agenda, and the courts are the instrument by which
such enforcement is actually accomplished. Therefore, if homeless
advocates are to have compelling arguments against the CJC, it must
be in how the CJC addresses the problem of homelessness, rather
than in the existence of unjust laws.
The Coalition further argues that the method of enforcement that
the CJC would employ would encourage police to arrest more
homeless people than they currently do. There is a strong argument
to be made that the police selectively enforce quality-of-life statutes
against homeless people. 59 As applied here, the argument is that
police in the Tenderloin will understand that a homeless person will
receive help at the CJC, thereby giving the officer an incentive to
arrest a homeless person and get them access to services, rather than
simply leave them alone or issue a citation.
Although many local governments have attempted to implement
quality-of-life campaigns to "clean up" their cities, most have
failed . 60 Homeless persons tend to bear the burden of such efforts,
frequently resulting in a cycle of incarceration that they are
powerless to resist. 6 1 San Francisco currently operates under what
might be called a "light switch" model for dealing with
homelessness-related offenses. A police officer who sees a homeless
person committing a quality-of-life crime can either issue an
infraction or file more serious charges (assuming that she does not
want to ignore the problem altogether). When an infraction is issued,
59. Nordberg, supra note 23, at 269-7 1.
60. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New
York Style, 97 MICH. L. REv. 291, 295-96, 332 (1998).
61. Patricia G. Barnes, Safer Streets at What Cost? Critics Say the Homeless and Substance
Abusers Are Most Likely to Suffer When Police Crack Down on Petty Offenses, A.B.A. J., June
1998, at 24; John J. Ammann, Addressing Quality of Life Crimes in Our Cities: Criminalization,
Community Courts and Community Compassion, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 811, 813-14 (2000).
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there is no way to follow up and determine if that person was able to
find housing or assistance. The public tends to pay the costs of
benign neglect through increased use of emergency rooms and fire
department services by the homeless, the poor, and the victims of
crime. Further, even though the city spends more money on
and jobs, the number
programs designed to help people find homes
62
of homeless people continues to steadily rise.
The second option under the "light switch" model is to file
formal charges against a homeless person. This selection can have
disastrous consequences for the person charged. Once a charge is
filed, the person can lose valuable SSI benefits, access to other forms
of assistance, be subject to significant fines, and spend time in jail.63
The public also suffers under this approach by paying the costs of
processing and incarcerating individuals who usually do not pose any
danger to society. 64 Additionally, the community suffers from the
ultimately ineffective use of police resources. When the process of
arrest and incarceration repeats, as it has, the community must
expend the same amount of taxpayer dollars over and over, achieving
little more than a guarantee that the cycle will continue. Some critics
argue that the problem with such programs is that they do not address
the underlying causes of poverty and homelessness. 65 This is
precisely the angle that the CJC has adopted: trying to identify the
underlying causes of poverty for the individual and address them
directly and comprehensively. The whole purpose of the CJC is to
find alternatives to incarceration, such as providing shelter, treatment
programs and job training, and remove roadblocks that prevent a
person from rising above the poverty that brings them into conflict
with the law, such as cessation of benefits or criminal records.
The argument that a well-intentioned police officer may feel
more inclined to arrest a homeless person out of a sense of
compassion because he thinks the CJC will help that person, has
some merit. However, this is not always the case. First, it is not
62. Nina Wu, Street Hope: City Money Doesn't Answer the Problem, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec.
10, 2001, at Al; Ann Lane, Quality Control: Why Is The City Attorney ProsecutingHomeless
People?, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, Feb. 16, 2000.
63. Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral:Homelessness and Its Criminalization, 14 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 1, 23 (1996); Harcourt, supra note 60, at 344; Nordberg, supra note 23, at 278;
Ammann, supra note 61, at 813.
64. Ammann, supra note 61, at 820; Nordberg, supra note 23, at 303-04.
65. Nordberg, supra note 23, at 276.
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necessary for an officer to make an arrest in order for a homeless
person to receive services at the CJC. The ability of the court to
make positive changes in a person's life does increase dramatically
with the additional power to impose criminal sanctions, because the
court can compel a person to follow through with treatment programs
or other services that require reciprocal effort from recipients. Still,
the court could also dismiss charges, leaving the accused with a clean
record, no jail time and access to valuable services that have been
specifically coordinated to achieve the maximum effect. This option
is a more preferable plan than the status quo.
Currently, there is no opportunity for courts to effectively help
homeless people, and the social service community needs assistance
to make good use of the court's hard work. There is nothing that the
court can do about the city's decision to make sleeping in public a
crime. The CJC can, however, manage how a person accused of
sleeping in public is treated in the system. The debate over qualityof-life crimes is not specific to the CJC, and the focus should shift to
the most beneficial way to enforce such laws.

Conclusion
The Tenderloin CJC is not an experimental parallel justice
system, as some critics have labeled it, but rather it is the next logical
step towards an intelligent approach to criminal justice. The model
of a community court that attempts to address the root causes of
offensive behavior in a way that is effective and meaningful has been
successful in every community that has adopted it for over a decade.
Results show reduced recidivism rates, community support and
lower costs to the public. In an era of bloated prison populations and
failed "get tough" policies, there needs to be an awareness, now
more than ever, that there are other options for dealing with crime.
The CJC represents one such option.
California has had great success with drug and mental health
courts introduced over recent years. It has incurred significantly
lowered costs by adopting the idea that the court can help people
overcome addictions and escape a cycle of poverty and criminality
through oversight and monitoring progress.
The Tenderloin
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community should apply what has been learned from drug courts to
all types of non-violent crimes.
San Francisco has a rare opportunity to rise above petty political
differences and the fear of systemic persecution to become the first
community in California to take the current court model to the next
level. The investment of transitioning to a community court system
would be minimal compared to the potential savings that could be
reaped even if the CJC was modestly successful in reducing the
impact of minor crimes on the justice system.
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